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Atwell: Drawbacks of Federal Natural Gas Regulation

DRAWBACKS OF FEDERAL NATURAL GAS
REGULATION
J. Evans Atwel*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Before I discuss with you several areas where I believe government
regulation and, in particular Federal Energy Commission regulation, is
actually hurting more than it is helping, I think in fairness I should
recognize certain handicaps that this new Commission starts out with.
I think no child of Congress ever come into the cruel, cold regulatory
world with more handicaps than the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 1 For starters, there is its given name, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. The Commissioner is careful to
point out to you that he was going to refer it to as the F-E-R-C. I don't
care how hard they try, it is going to be known to those of us who
practice before it, and those of us who are regulated by it, as "the
FERC." You would think that, coming from the Nixon years when we
had the Committee to Re-Elect the President, which became CREEP,
the incumbent administration would be more sensitive to the acronyms
that develop from the use of certain names.
In any event the new Commission has been really given vastly expanded regulatory authority, and it has not just inherited the responsibilities of the Federal Power Commission. However, having been
given this expanded authority, it has not been given any significantly
additional personnel. For example, the FERC inherited only thirteen
people from the Interstate Commerce Commission to assume the tremendous burden of regulating oil pipeline rates and valuations. In
addition, the FERC has inherited from the Federal Power Commission
* Partner, Vinson & Elkins, Houston Texas; B.A. Rice Institute, LLB. University of Texas
Law School
1. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. §§ 401-407, 91 Stat. 582-87
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171-7177).
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a backlog of six thousand cases. The problem has been compounded
by the fact that, during the last six months of its existence, the Federal
Power Commission had an attrition rate of twenty percent. So what
we have now is about 119 or 120 vacancies on the Commission staff.
The new Commission really starts out in the world with two strikes
against it; therefore the FERC has asked for increased personnel in the
latest budget. I think the increase that was approved by Secretary
Schlesinger was in the neighborhood of 525 additional employees, although it appears they may only get 200. One of the real problems is
that the FERC does not have adequate personnel to handle the
caseload that it is charged by law with undertaking and handling.
That is one thing that we have got to remember: it is not a matter of
discretion with these agencies, with the FERC, as to whether they regulate or don't regulate. That is something the courts have told them
repeatedly that they have to do; so it is up to them to have to perform
the function in accordance with the particular laws.
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE DELAY

This brings me to the first area where I think that governmental
regulation, and in particular the Federal Power Commission, has been
hurting more than it has been helping. That is the question of delay. I
do not speak of delay as a matter of weeks or months, but I speak of
interminable delays. Delays that go on for so long that they kill projects
that are clearly in the public interest; delays that go on for years so that
there is no economic certainty, for either the regulated industries or the
consuming public.
I might just mention two examples. In the early 1960's, I was involved in a project whereby the then Humble Oil & Refining Company, now Exxon, was going to sell over six trillion feet of gas on a
warranted basis to the interstate market from the King Ranch in south
Texas. They wanted eighteen cents per thousand cubic feet (mc) for
the gas, and that price was going to virtually level over twenty years.
But the Commission was then trying to force everyone to take sixteen
cents. We had these prolonged and protracted hearings that went on
seemingly forever. Exxon finally just got sick of it and said to hell with
them-we are going to build our own thirty-six inch line to Houston
and sell the gas there. That is what they did, and the interstate market
lost six trillion cubic feet of gas because of delay.
Another example and one that I am very fond of is a case which
commenced in 1957 called the Rayne Field case which involves a field
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over in south Louisiana and the rates that should have been charged. I
can tell you right now that the Rayne Field case is still alive and is still
going. We have been to the Supreme Court of the United States three
times, we have gotten four decisions by courts of appeal, and we have
gotten nine decisions by the Federal Power Commission. We have
pending before the Commission at this time a settlement under which
the producers would refund approximately sixty million dollars. But
at best the case has gone on for over twenty years, resulting in tremendous economic uncertainty. I think that something has got to be done
to eradicate this type delay in the regulatory process.
Now it really has become a custom for each new chairman of the
Federal Power Commission or the now Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, to pronounce that he is going to revolutionize the procedures that have heretofore been followed; he is going to cut the Gordian knot and expedite the decisional process. Thus Charles Curtis,
the new chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, has
recently made several talks in which he has made that very point. I
certainly do not for a minute doubt his sincerity that he is going to do
everything he possibly can to streamline the regulatory process. But I
do think the problem is that the decisional process has to be conducted
within the confines of various and sundry laws, such as the Administrative Procedures Act 2 and basic due process, and it takes a long time.
In short I think that delay is inherent in the regulatory process. I think
it is a serious question as to whether the benefit to the public of certain
parts of the regulatory process are commensurate with the burden. I
really do not think there is any solution. Chairman Curtis has suggested that we try to go to generalized guidelines. Well, the old Federal Power Commission went to generalized guidelines when it went to
the national rate procedures, 3 but what do we have? We have biennial
decisions, whereby the Commission undertakes to set new rates for
every two years. By the time the new rates come out, the two years
have expired. As you know, we have had a recent decision for the
years 1975 and 1976 by the United States Supreme Court denying certiorari, in which Opinion 770-A became final. But here we are in 1978,
and the Commission has already commenced another biennial proceeding for the years 1977 and 1978, and there is no way that that decision is going to be rendered before 1978 is past, thus once again the
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1967).
3. FPC opinion 770-A 41 Fed. Reg. 50,199 (1976); FPC opinion 699-H 18 C.F.R. § 2.56a

(1976).
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decision is going to be antiquated. It is a very serious problem, and I
don't mean by that to say that we shouldn't try to minimize the delay. I
just simply point out that I think delay is a very serious factor in the
regulatory process that has to be weighed as to whether the regulations
themselves are justified.
III., BURDENSOME REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The second area that I think government is hurting more than
helping is the paper chase. In recent years, governmental agencies
have promulgated one form after another demanding that industry,
and I do not mean big industry-I mean relatively small businessmen,
fill out forms incessantly. I can tell you that one of the most guilty
culprits is the Federal Power Commission and, I presume its successor,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. People are spending tremendous sums of money and tremendous amounts of time to fill out
these forms. There is Form 40 for reporting your reserve data. There
is Form 64 for reporting expenditures for exploration and development. You have form this and form that. The medium and smaller
producers are really not set up to handle this. The old Federal Power
Commission required these forms to be filed by even the smallest producers, those that sold approximately 200,000 McF in interstate commerce each year. The new Commission has tried to ease that burden
by making the cutoff point 1,000,000 McF a year. I do know that they
have a particular task force, both in the FERC, and in the Department
of Energy itself, dedicated to streamlining this never ending request for
more and more information. But I would hope that our past experience is not indicative of what is going to happen in the future, because
we have seen it grow despite the protestations of the regulated. Obviously, government has to have and is entitled to have a certain reasonable amount of data, but I think they have clearly gone beyond the
pale, particularly in the energy area, resulting in a tremendous duplication and overlap. The Federal Trade Commission is always trying to
get information in this area in competition, with the Federal Power
Commission or the FERC. Something has got to be done to confine the
paper chase within reasonable bounds.
IV.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFLEXIBILITY

The third area that I want to focus on is the law's prevention of the
natural gas industry from exercising flexibility to meet gas shortage
problems. For example, in the southwestern United States in the win-
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ter we sometimes have a temporary surplus of gas that is used in the
summer to generate electricity for air conditioning purposes. You
might say that our peak use of natural gas comes in the summer because of the air conditioning situation, whereas the peak use of gas in
the northern United States comes in the winter. Why shouldn't there
be some type of flexible arrangement whereby the intrastate pipelines
could sell that surplus gas on a temporary, short-term basis, to meet the
needs of the North. There are sixty day arrangements which have
proven to be helpful to a certain degree, but they do not reach the total
available excess supply. I think that we need to have legislation that
will permit that to be done, and I think that the industry is clearly in
the best position to work this out, rather than having an energy czar to
try to direct allocation of gas.
V.

INTERSTATE DEDICATION PROBLEM

A fourth area where I think government may be hurting more than
helping is the position that the Federal Power Commission, and now
the FERC, has taken in various cases about land and acreage being
dedicated to interstate commerce. They claim that once it is dedicated
to interstate commerce, it is always dedicated to interstate commerce.
A case here in Oklahoma involves a French company called Aquitane
that dedicated leases throughout a million acre area. They drilled a
few of those leases and started delivery of gas in interstate commerce.
As to certain other leases, they never drilled and let them go. Four or
five years later, someone else came along and took a new lease on the
same land previously covered by these expired undrilled leases which
were let go. They drilled and found a new gas discovery. The Federal
Power Commission came in claiming the land was still dedicated to
interstate commerce. The big problem is that, if that is true, we are in
a situation where the taker of an oil and gas lease never knows whether
it has been dedicated because most natural gas contracts are not recorded. I think that this will have a deleterious effect on the exploration for and development of additional gas supplies onshore. I have
made that argument in the courthouse and before the Commission, and
I am afraid that, at least before the Commission, it has been rejected.
Although in the courthouse we seem to be doing somewhat better. I
think that it is a bad policy from the Commission's standpoint regardless of whether it is within the Commission's authority under the Emer-
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gency Natural Gas Act.4
That brings us to the pricing situation. The new Commission has
really deferred taking any action on pricing until it sees what happens
in the legislative arena. As previously noted, we have before the new
Commission a pending proceeding to set new national rates for the
years 1977 and 1978. The evidence that has been submitted in those
cases would indicate a rate between $2.00 and $2.60 per McF. On the
other hand, a group that calls itself the Consumer Coalition has filed a
petition with the Commission claiming that even the rates recently approved in Opinion 770A are too high. They claim further that this
Commission should immediately start regulating intrastate rates because they have an adverse effect on the supply of gas available to the
interstate market. That petition has been put on the shelf pending action by Congress.
VI.

LEGISLATIVE ACTION

I now want to turn to the legislative situation, because I think that,
if and when Congress passes a National Energy Act, the natural gas
portion of that legislation is going to determine to a great extent the
future role that the FERC is going to play in maximizing the supply of
available natural gas. I presume that each of you is aware that we
have had a legislative impasse on the National Energy Act due to the
fundamental differences in the natural gas legislation that was passed
by the House of Representatives' and the corresponding legislation that
was passed by the Senate.6 Generally speaking, the House bill would
extend federal regulation to all sales of gas, interstate and intrastate.
The House bill would provide a ceiling price of $1.75 per McF for new
gas, and it had a narrow definition of new gas. The House bill stands
for more regulation, not less regulation. On the other hand, the Senate
passed legislation sponsored by Senator Pearson of Kansas and Senator
Bensten of Texas which would eliminate FERC price regulation of new
onshore gas after two years, and would terminate such regulation of
new offshore gas after five years. This bill has a much more liberal
definition of new gas and more liberal pricing provision. Both the
House and the Senate passed its respective version of this legislation
many months ago, and a joint committee was set up to try to reconcile
the differences. That joint committee started meeting early in Decem4. 15 U.S.C. § 717-717w (1976).
5. H.R. 6831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
6. S. 1469, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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ber, and they were able to reconcile many differences in the National
Energy Act, until they got to natural gas. Immediately there began to
be a lot of political posturing, and this proved to be a very emotional
and almost explosive issue. The acrimony culminated in President
Carter making remarks that were less than complimentary of industry
representatives advocating deregulation. I think since that time things
have cooled down considerably, and we have seen a series of compromises proposed and fail. However, it appears that the parties are
getting closer and closer together. I believe that in the relatively near
future they are going to reach agreement on the natural gas legislation.
Before giving you my best guess as to where the conferees are going to come out on the major points of such legislation, I think I might
mention two relatively unknown factors that probably will ultimately
play a significant part in making a compromise possible. First, even
though the Senate had in effect passed deregulation, nine out of the
eighteen conferees they appointed were opposed to deregulation. So
the Senate part of the committee was split. That really made it kind of
difficult, if not impossible, for negotiations to be conducted because the
Senate conferees really did not have a firm position. But during the
course of these negotiations, Senator Lee Metcalf of Montanta, one of
the Senators opposed to deregulation, died. That made it nine to eight,
and needless to say the nine would not permit Senator Metcalf to be
replaced. Therefore, there was a nine to eight majority in favor of
deregulation. They had a more definite position, even though there
was still a split.
The second factor is very interesting. In January of this year, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, in a
completely unexpected position paper, advocated deregulation. The
Carter people tried to play it down, but I think it was a shock to them.
I also think the White House got the message that its entrenched position against deregulation needed reevaluation.
I want to give you my best guestimate as to where we might come
out on some of the principal features of any new natural gas legislation.
Clearly, the big political issue is whether we are going to have more or
less federal regulation of natural gas prices. The Carter people and the
House want more regulation, and the Senate, at least the majority of
the conferees, want to have deregulation. It is a hot political issue,
particularly for a politician from a producing state. He could hardly
afford to vote for a bill calling for more regulation. The compromise
that they apparently have come to is one under which we will have
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more regulation, and then less regulation, that is we will have regulation of both interstate and intrastate sales for a limited period of time.
They call this solution light at the end of the tunnel. After Viet Nam, I
would have thought they would have come up with a better phrase.
This means that for those that favor deregulation, there is light at the
end of the tunnel. However, the people who are advocating regulation
say we are likely to have a terrible situation develop when regulation
ceases. May I say it is regulation only of new gas that is going to cease.
Regulation of old gas will continue. From the compromise, it appears
that the legislation will give the President the authority to reimpose
controls during a two-year period after deregulation, if the price for
new gas during the preceding six months exceeds the ceiling price that
would have been in effect for such new gas if the controls had continued. In the political parlance this is called the safety net for consumers
in the event that deregulation results in excessive prices.
There appears to be close agreement as to the ceiling price that
would be put on new gas. It appears the new gas price will start out at
$1.84 and will escalate annually by an inflation factor, computed either
from the Consumer Price Index, or the gross national product inflator,
plus either three or four percent. What the esclator will really be is
inflation plus three of four percent, so that a seven or eight percent
inflation rate would yield a ten or eleven percent annual increase.
The definition of new gas has given and continues to give some
problems. I think everyone seems to agree that new onshore gas
should be defined as that which is sold or commercially produced for
the first time on or after April 20, 1977, the date the legislation was
introduced, from an existing reservoir from which gas was not produced in commercial quantities before that date. That definition is
fairly broad and takes into account both new discoveries and gas that is
in the ground now that has not been connected. One catch is that if
the gas was wrongfully withheld it would not qualify, and what constitutes wrongful withholding is another unanswered question. Offshore
there is more of a problem. The people favoring regulation say that
producers in the offshore area are fixed in interstate commerce and are
subject to regulation in any event, and are not entitled to the same definition as onshore gas. They have advocated that the only offshore gas
that could qualify as new gas would be gas that was drilled on leases
that were acquired on or after April 20, 1977. There has been a continuing attempt to expand that definition to include newly discovered reservoirs under older leases. Where we are really going to come out
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offshore is difficult to determine at this time, but I believe there is going
to be some type of newly discovered reservoir provision, and the determination of whether it is a new reservoir is going to be by a state
agency or the United States Geological Service, probably subject to the
right of the FERC to overrule that determination.
One of the most hotly contested parts of the bill is the allocation
authority Senator Jackson and his adherents advocate that the President must be given the absolute power to take gas from one state and
give it to another. Needless to say, the people in Texas, Oklahoma and
other states that produce and consume a great deal of gas oppose this,
supporting no allocation authority. I feel that it is gas that we found,
bought, relied upon and built factories on, and we cannot afford to
have our operations conducted in a manner which could result in a
sudden loss of that gas. It appears that the compromise is going to
result in a limited allocation authority. It will be limited to situations
where there is a declaration of emergency, for the length of the emergency, and it will also be limited strictly to gas that is free from boilers.
That seems to be the compromise that the parties are working toward,
and I believe they will finally reach.
There are numerous other provisions in this bill, and I might just
touch on two or three. As to existing intrastate sales that are now being made, and many of them are made at prices higher than the $1.84,
if the price is higher than the $1.84 you can continue to collect that
higher price, and that price can continue to escalate by the inflation
factor, but not the three or four percent bonus. If and when the price
of new gas catches up the ceiling price for these existing intrastate sales
will move in tandem with the new gas price.
Secondly, if the intrastate price is below the $1.84 at the present
time, then you could escalate in accordance with your contract until
you reach the ceiling price for new gas, and then the price would move
in tandem with it.
There is another big issue, and that is what happens when we have
so-called rollover contracts. If you are in the interstate market and
your price is down at twenty or thirty cents, you will be entitled to go
up to fifty-five cents and that fifty-five cents would rise with the inflation factor. However, if you are in the intrastate market and your
price is a low one, anywhere below a dollar, you get to go up to a
dollar, and again the dollar ceiling would be subject to escalation by
the inflation factor. Thus in the interstate market, if your price at the
end of your contract was above the fifty-five cent minimum, you would
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keep that price and keep on going with the inflation factor; while in the
intrastate market, if your price was above a dollar when the contract
expired, you would keep the price that was in existence and that price
would continue to escalate with the inflation factor.
I think they are going to provide special prices for so-called high
cost gas. They are talking about a price of $2.00 to $2.09 subject to an
escalation equal to the inflation factor plus four percent for gas that is
produced from Devonian shale, geopressurized brine and coal seams.
But the interesting thing is that so far they also define high cost gas to
include gas that is produced from wells drilled to a depth greater than
15,000 feet. I know in certain parts of Oklahoma that can be extremely
important. They are also apparently going to make a special price provision for so-called stripper well gas. There is some chance that they
could actually deregulate that, but probably they will also allow it a
price of $2.00 to $2.09. Stripper well gas is gas produced in a well that
produces less than 60 McF per day on an average. I presume there
will be some base period.production control level which will require a
computation of how much gas you have produced.
Let me finish the caveat that even if they get over the natural gas
hurdle, I am afraid that we still have to deal with crude oil equalization
tax which may prove to be just as difficult if not more difficult to solve.
But I do say that I earnestly believe that it is time we had a National
Energy Policy. It has to be a realistic one, and I think that if this Congress does not pass one, it will be bad for this country in many ways.
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